Recent extreme events have significantly raised the question of the role of public and private sectors in providing adequate financial protection to victims. Developing publicprivate insurance programs could constitute one of the most appealing ways to solve the problem of financing the consequences of those large-scale catastrophes. However, catastrophic risks present very specific characteristics which challenge any traditional economic approaches to analyzing them. Further, the government may have better information about the risk than insurers (e.g., national security). Currently, little has been done in the economic literature to better understand how this assumption impacts on how risks are shared between all stakeholders in such partnerships. This paper analyzes policy issues related to risk/information sharing between insurers and a dedicated State-backed governmental reinsurer, who are part of a national partnership program. The government develops a mandatory coverage against catastrophic risks and decides the level of premiums levied against the insureds. Using a game-theoretical approach, we show that a government can act to induce private insurers in the country to participate in the partnership instead of leaving the market. By modulating its premium policy, the government can also led them to adopt two different strategies: (1) behave as a simple financial intermediary between the insured and the public reinsurer so that the latter supports the largest portion of the risks or (2) conserve the largest part of risks to benefit from market conditions created by the government seeking to avoid its intervention ex post to bail out the public reinsurer. The paper also discusses the impacts of government information-sharing strategies on the game equilibrium. Illustrations are provided for natural hazards and terrorism risk.
I. Introduction
In most developed countries, insurance constitutes an important pillar of economic development, as it is one of the principal mechanisms used by individuals and organizations for managing risk. Without the capacity of transferring risk to the insurance and reinsurance industry, it is likely that numerous activities would not have had the development that we know today.
In the field of insurance and risk management, however, extreme events present a set of very specific characteristics as they can have long-term impacts on the social and economic continuity of the country(ies) they affect. This raises the question of the responsibility of the private and public sectors in providing adequate financial protection to victims of these catastrophes.
Over the recent years, levels of insured and non-insured economic damage due to the occurrence of catastrophes have dramatically increased, questioning the insurability of catastrophic risks by the private market alone. Facing unprecedented large-scale claims, the private sector of insurance may be actually induced to severely restrict the insurance supply or even refuse to cover against specific lines of catastrophic risks in the future if not required by law.
However, because these events are capable of inflicting debilitating impacts on a large number of people and firms, covering them often constitutes a national issue. Governments, therefore, have a social and economic responsibility to provide citizenry and commercial firms with alternative answers. This can be done by developing purely government programs or by offering the private sector of insurance enough incentives to partner with the government to establish a joint program. This paper discusses this second option by providing a theoretical framework of public-private partnership regarding catastrophic risk coverage.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the specific challenges raised by extreme events: increased level of loss due to catastrophes worldwide which questions the insurability of such events by the private sector alone, the resulting need for combining strengths of the public and private sectors to deal with that issue and, more specifically, the possibility of seeing national government entities more informed about certain risks than the private sector. This section provides readers who might not be familiar with those issues with some background evidence. Section 3 presents a basic model of public-private risk sharing in the form of a game with Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). The framework is presented in this section: the model's hypotheses including the creation of a dedicated State-backed governmental reinsurer, the players' action, the objectives of the government and the insurance industry and finally the taxonomy of the PBE candidates. This section also presents the assumptions relative to premiums levied against policyholders. This paper analyzes two different risk sharing policies by the government in more detail: using the insurers as simple indemnification intermediaries or looking for the financial autonomy of the program such that the state-guarantee of the public reinsurer is never triggered. Section 4 gives a characterization of the pooling or separating equilibria that correspond to those two cases, with a specific focus on the ultimate risk-sharing between the public and private sectors. It is worth noting that if a condition is that government does not reveal its knowledge about the risks (e.g., sensitive information about terrorist groups), strategies leading to the pooling equilibrium are the only viable ones. We discuss the results of the model and possible extensions in Section 4 as well. Section 5 illustrates the theoretical approach with examples: first, the insurance against natural disasters in France as well as an application of the model for the U.S. market; second, some post 9/11 national insurance programs recently developed for coverage against terrorism. Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendixes provide detailed proofs for the two propositions of the paper. loss in the history of world insurance, after hurricane Katrina, with current estimates at $33 billion (Doherty et al., 2005) . 3 The reinsurers, most of them European, paid nearly two-third of the claims. These reinsurance payments came in the wake of outlays triggered by a series of catastrophic natural disasters over the past decade and portfolio losses due to stock market declines. Having their capital base severely hit, most reinsurers decided to reduce their terrorist offerings drastically or even to stop covering this risk.
Considering such a new scale of catastrophic risks, the issue of developing specific programs for risk coverage is obviously key to providing victims with adequate indemnification, therefore assuring the continuity of economic and social activities of the devastated country.
Catastrophe Risk Sharing: the Need for Public-Private Partnerships. With recent disasters and their resulting effect on the solvency of insurance companies, the question of liquidity and insurers' insolvency has become of great importance. Insurers may be reluctant to cover these risks alone. Traditionally, the insurance industry avoids these problems by transferring such risks to the reinsurance market (Borch, 1990) . However, the current reinsurance capacity for coverage against natural catastrophes and terrorism is limited, and prices of catastrophe reinsurance tend to seriously increase in the aftermath of major catastrophes. 4 The development of "securitization" (property-catastrophe-risk financial instruments) could also provide an appealing way to finance these risks. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake in the early 1990s, property catastrophe reinsurance was in short supply and the price of reinsurance more than doubled in the U.S. compared with the late 1980s. For insurers to provide their clients with the same amount of coverage they offered prior to these events they had to find capital from other sources. They collaborated with the investment banking community to develop new classes of financial instruments. Alternative risk transfers, such as options and catastrophe bonds, emerged to cover these losses by transferring part of the risks to the $19 trillion capital markets. 5 However, whereas the development of catastrophe modeling and simulation has been effective owing to the advances in information technology, the use of financial instruments remains under utilized. Though insurers and reinsurers had over $4.3 billion in catastrophe bonds outstanding at the end of 2003, an increase of more than 50% over 2002 (Swiss Re, 2004 ). This market is still considerably below the expectations of insurers, reinsurers, and investment bankers, accounting in 2002 for less than 3% of worldwide catastrophe reinsurance coverage (Grossi and Kunreuther, 2005) .
Still, we have not seen any definitive argument to show that the private sector alone can handle the problem of insolvency in case of extreme financial consequences of natural disasters and large-scale terrorism.
3 Not accounting for the fact that the federal Victim Compensation Fund that will have paid nearly $5 billion to 9/11 victims and their family (Chalk et al., 2005) . 4 Very few reinsurers in place provide protection against industry-wide losses for catastrophic event greater than $5 billion. Several arguments explain the reason why the prices of catastrophe reinsurance are high: insufficient reinsurance capital, reinsurers' market power, inefficiency of the corporate form of reinsurance, high transaction costs, moral hazard and adverse selection at the insurer level (Froot , 1999 (Froot , , 2001 . 5 Among the first works regarding the development of derivatives and catastrophe bonds, see, D' Arcy and France, 1992; Niehaus and Mann, 1992 ; for more recent publications, see Cox, Fairchild and Pedersen, 2000 , Nell and Richter, 2004 , and Lane, 2002 . Since the 9/11 attacks, the possibility of transferring some terrorism risk to financial markets has also been studied; see Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2005) .
These low-probability/high-consequence events are difficult to cover for several additional reasons.
On the supply side, because insurers are dealing with a lack of historical data on catastrophic events (as they are new in their nature or scale), the aversion for ambiguity leads them to set premiums higher than they would if they had a perfect knowledge of the distribution of risk (Kunreuther, Hogarth, and Meszaros, 1993) . In some instances, the situation is counterbalanced by a regulation of premium rates that requires private insurers to sell insurance coverage at a lower price than is necessary for business (Priest, 1996; Jaffee and Russell, 1997) . However, the insurers will often prefer not to cover these risks or deeply limit their involvement.
On the demand side, it is well known that with time potential purchasers tend to underestimate the real level of risks and thus consider the insurance premiums as being too expensive, limiting the level of coverage (Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Ganderton et al., 2000; Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004) . The charity hazard 6 also induces potential purchasers of insurance to limit their coverage or even to prefer not to be covered at all.
As a result of these demand and supply effects, numerous citizens and firms could be left without coverage. However, under the public pressure in the aftermath of a catastrophe, the government would have to financially help the citizens and firms that were victims of the catastrophe (through emergency measures, crisis management, disaster relief to uninsured citizens, etc). This raises the question of the Samaritan's dilemma associated with federal disaster assistance.
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The continuing increase in the cost of aid for governments 8 has caused policymakers to look closely at possible national insurance programs to levy ex ante contributions and increase the general concerns on those issues. The creation of specific public insurance programs may be one of the solutions (e.g. the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program). But it may be very costly for the government in implementation as well as day-to-day management (levying surcharges, estimating damage of a catastrophe, payment of claims, etc.), thus leading to inefficiencies. On the other hand, insurers can easily add and manage an extra line of risk in their portfolio. They can also take advantage of their commercial network throughout a country to sell the associated policies and collect premiums. Moreover, payment of claims is usually much faster when organized by the insurers. For that reason, collaboration between the government and the insurers could, at least partially, be part of a global solution for catastrophic risk coverage.
What would be the strengths of the public sector in such a partnership? Government presents at least two key strengths. First, government constitutes a powerful source of wealth redistribution toward losses already occurred. What is crucial here is the government's ability to diversify the risks over the entire population and to spread past losses to future generations of taxpayers. This is a form of cross-time diversification that the 6 Defined by Browne and Hoyt (2000) as "the tendency of an individual at risk not to purchase insurance or other risk financing as a result of a reliance on expected charity from (…) a government emergency program". 7 The Samaritan's dilemma was introduced by Nobel laureate James Buchanan. The basic idea is that the government (the Good Samaritan) wants to help victims after a major loss. While such an attitude is likely to generate public approval after a disaster it has potentially negative effects on potential victims' behavior prior to the event. Indeed, it creates moral hazard problems by encouraging risk-taking behavior (including not purchasing insurance) by those who feel they will be financially protected by the government action after an event. See Buchanan (1975) .
8 "Since the late 70's the Federal government has spent annually an average of $8 billion (current) on disaster assistance. This is far greater than the average annual loss borne by reinsurers on US catastrophe coverage" Froot (2001). private market cannot achieve because of the incompleteness of inter-generational private markets and legal limitations for insurers to accumulate financial reserves (Gollier, 2002). 9 Government involvement in a public-private program of catastrophic risk coverage could thus be a definite advantage in that it can limit the potential of catastrophe losses for insurers, for instance by being a reinsurer of last resort.
Second, government can constrain adverse selection phenomena by the enforcement of insurance purchase for a specific market segment exposed to the catastrophic risks we are concerned with here (i.e., mandatory coverage). Even if this governmental control of adverse selection does not reduce the risk itself, it constitutes a strong vector of redistribution.
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For all these reasons, the idea of developing special arrangements between the public and private sectors to deal with coverage against catastrophic risks obviously emerges and needs to be analyzed in further details. Since the private sector of insurance can simply refuse to cover these risks (to the extent that there is no regulation preventing this), a key question to analyze is how a government can work with insurers to create a specific program based upon mutual interests.
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Information Distribution. The observation of specific markets for coverage against extreme natural hazards and terrorism risk indicates that the distribution of information between government agencies and the private sector of insurance can be quite specific. There are actually situations where the former is more informed about the risks than the latter.
Consider, for example, international terrorism. Whatever information exists on possible attacks or current threats is kept secret by government agencies for national security reasons. These services will not explicitly share such information with the private sector of insurance. The problem posed by terrorism appears to be one where there is symmetry of non-information on the risk between policyholders and insurers. This information issue constitutes a notable feature of terrorism as a catastrophic risk. Terrorism is not only a new risk with limited available historical data for insurers, it is also a risk where the government appears to be the most informed party (Godard et al., 2002) .
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With respect to natural disasters, it can be the case that there has been a long-time lack of interest from insurers regarding the specific risks they had not really considered. There could be several reasons for this: because the risks represent only a small part of their portfolio, because a detailed risk analysis nationwide would be too expensive, 13 because they were not considered catastrophic until an extreme event occurred, and/or because government programs cover these risks. 9 The public sector is also able to achieve high diversification by pooling several sources of risks. 10 For a recent survey of adverse selection phenomena in insurance, see Dionne, Doherty and Fombaron (2000) . 11 In using this expression we consider situations where the two sectors are capable of defining and mutually accepting specific configurations of risk-sharing that would respond to their own expectations.
12 Of course, this does not mean all government agencies are uniformly informed; for an insightful discussion about recent information sharing failure among intelligence services in the U.S., see Garicano and Posner (2005) . 13 In the United States, for example, the 1973 Flood Disaster Protection Act made the national Flood Insurance Program responsible for identifying all communities nationwide that contained areas at risk of serious flood hazard. As of 1998, over 18,700 communities had joined the NFIP, for twothirds of which a detailed flood study has been conducted. According to Pasterick (1998) , "through fiscal year 1997, the cost of this massive study effort has been about $1.15 billion".
As such a situation (government more informed) appears counter-intuitive when viewed in the perspective of the economic literature of insurance, we have been interested in discussing how such an assumption affects the risk-sharing output in specific public-private partnerships.
14 In this whole context, this paper presents in the next section a simple model of public-private partnership in which the government not only has better information but it can also determine the price of coverage. The central question that this paper addresses under these assumptions is What national policies can a government develop regarding the partnership it establishes with the private sector of insurance to cover extreme events? In other words, how do policymakers consider the program resulting from the partnership? Do they use insurers as simple intermediaries between the government and the citizens/firms they want covered, or do they really look for an effective risk-sharing with the insurers? If so, how does the trade-off between information-sharing and risk-sharing between the public and private sector play? To our knowledge, this problem of public-private partnership in developing national coverage against catastrophic risks has not been formalized in such a way in the literature.
III. A Model of Public-Private Partnership
Framework of the Public-Private Partnership. In order to investigate the public-private partnership for insuring catastrophic risks, we first characterize the general framework. We consider a country where there is an extremely limited insurance market for the class of risks we study here. To fill the gap, a partnership is launched between the government and the private insurers and a new insurance program is established. The government votes for the application of an extra charge against the insureds on specific basic lines of insurance (e.g. property and casualty). This extra charge equals a certain percentage of that basic insurance premium. If the insurers decide to participate in the program, they collect these extra charges and receive a participation commission from the government in return. For this line of risk, participating insurers can be reinsured by an unlimited state-guaranteed governmental (public) reinsurer that is established for that purpose, GRe. This configuration is depicted in Figure 1 .
The Game. We consider a simple game of incomplete information. In order to simplify the model, assumptions are made on both the set of catastrophe risks and the possible actions. We are only interested in the events covered by the catastrophe risk program during a given period of time, for example, one to five years. D denotes the total insured damage due to some catastrophes covered by the public-private program (e.g., terrorism, earthquakes or floods). The game has three players: Nature, the Public Sector and the Private Insurers.
Player's Action. For the sake of simplicity, Player 1, Nature, can choose only between two levels of likelihood that an extreme event occurs, p L and p H , with p L < p H .
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Player 2, the Public Sector (or government hereafter), 16 fixes the level of the extra charge rate denoted β, taking into account its knowledge of the potential occurrence of the catastrophic damage. β is here a parameter. Referring to the game theory literature, we call the strategy (or action) played by the government the "extra charge policy". The government 
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Π is the total premiums of the basic contracts (e.g. Property and Casualty) on which the extra charge is applied. Therefore, the total extra charges collected for that catastrophic risk line over the period of time considered here are β.Π (i.e., the total premiums for the program).
Player 3, the private insurance industry (or insurers), receives the total extra charges collected for that line, β.Π. The insurance industry's behavior is assumed to be summarized by a single action: the reinsurance transfer rate to the governmental reinsurer (GRe) 18 , denoted by α. The private insurers are assumed to be reinsured only by the public reinsurer, GRe. They choose a transfer rate to GRe α in
. It is worth noting here that we impose a restriction on that reinsurance transfer rate. The introduction of such sub-limits allows the government to impact on the minimal and maximal risk-sharing with the public reinsurer (a more specific case than insurers allowed to choose within the whole [0,1] interval). Insurers can keep the largest part of the premiums and risks by playing a low transfer rate α or choose to transfer a major portion to GRe and then take the action "a high transfer rate". The high limit of reinsurance quota-share allows the program to share a minimum percentage of the risks with the insurers (they keep a minimum percentage (1-α)) whatever their decision of transfer. The low rate limits the amount of losses the insurers would bear in case of catastrophic damage if they had decided to keep the largest possible portion of risks.
From a theoretical perspective, as the interval of α's is determined by government, one could suggest the government determine the optimal α for them, α*, and then simply squeeze the interval of possible reinsurance by GRe toward α*. Such a strategy, however, presents several important limitations. We mention two of them here. First, it limits the main motivation of this paper which is to study different government policies/alternatives, for each of which we determine the conditions of existence of equilibrium and resulting risk-sharing between insurers and the public reinsurer. Should one decide the establishment of a unique α* possible transfer, the model would be immediately reduced to two trivial cases: (a) the insurers participate and both price and risk transfer variables are fixed by the government; (b) they refuse to participate, and the existence of a public reinsurer does not make any sense anymore. Second, an a more practical note, it is far from certain that any insurance association would welcome its members not having any command control in the partnership. In fact, any private reinsurer would have hard time doing business if the only alternative it offered to its potential clients would be a take-it or leave it treaty based on only one possible level of transfer.
The introduction of lower and upper limits on α (imposed by the government in our model) satisfies a type of government control as well as a certain degree of flexibility for the insurers in their action within this partnership.
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Finally, we also assume that the government offers the insurers a commission m in order to induce them to participate in the program. m is a poll commission, which does not depend on the level of risk kept by insurers. Players' Preferences. In the standard theoretic framework, the two main stakeholders are (i) the public sector and (ii) the private insurers who decide according to their own preferences. The criteria for action are the following.
The government wishes all catastrophe victims to be compensated. However, the establishment of such an insurance program based on a national redistribution induces several costs. First, there is the total amount of extra charges paid by the insured, βΠ. The payment by the government (here the Treasury) of the participation commission m to private insurers also has to be taken into account. Moreover, as GRe is a publicly owned company, the Treasury seeks to balance the public reinsurer. So as the government accepts a possible ex post public intervention (risk financing) by offering an unlimited guarantee to GRe, we have to consider the effect of such an intervention by introducing a parameter λ, which represents the shadow price of public funds. The greater λ, the more reluctant the 20 As suggested by one of the referees, and in the same vein than our discussion on not having a unique possible transfer rate α decided by the government, an alternative would be to make m chosen by government depend on the level of risk assumed by the insurers. That endogeneity would certainly be an interesting alternative scenario to discuss but it is not studied here. In fact, in previous versions of the paper, we studied that case where both m and β were endogenous variables on which government looks for maximization of utility (FOC on m* that guarantees insurers' participation depending on the level of risk). By controlling both m and β, government might increase its utility under certain circumstances. Making m endogenous also means, however, that m-along with β-gives a signal to insurers about the risks. That results in too many sub-cases to study and thresholds that are not always intuitive, mainly due to the two different sources of signal, β and m. Our final choice has been for a "participation commission" only. The fact that it does not depend on the level of risk covered by the insurers also translates a will to make that component of the public-private partnership program more easily manageable over time. Discussions with practitioners in charge of similar programs in several countries actually revealed that establishing a program that was easily manageable was an important aspect; a pool commission facilitates that. government is to financing risk. Hence, in this game, the Treasury has to deal with a permanent trade-off between setting a low extra charge to make the program more popular for citizens and firms, and making its expenses balanced (limiting its ex post intervention).
Adding to its own objective, we can consider that the government internalizes all the objectives of the public sector as a whole: the insured citizens and firms, GRe, and its own expenses.
With such program in place, it is obvious that the Treasury would like private insurers to keep the largest portion of risks in order to avoid having to pay when the reserves of GRe are not high enough. 21 In this specific case, we have to take into account the shadow cost of public funds. In all other cases, the shadow cost does not appear. Neither the benefits nor losses obtained by the insurers nor the benefits of GRe (because they are not transferred to the Treasury) are affected by this parameter in our model. The shadow cost of public funds is only considered when the Treasury has to operate its guarantee to GRe. Taking into account such an argument, the definition of utility U(.) of the Treasury can be written as follows:
; The first equation corresponds to the case in which the total amount of extra charges is high enough to compensate all the victims of the catastrophic events (with total damage D) that occur with a probability p (L or H) during the studied period of time. The ex post governmental intervention is not required because
β . The benefit of the public reinsurer, which positively affects the utility of the public sector in this model, is the difference between the total premiums received from the private insurers and the total amount of reimbursement paid by GRe. The second equation corresponds to the case in which the extra charge policy is not high enough: the premium received is too low to compensate the portion of the damage the public reinsurer would have to pay. GRe is virtually bankrupted at the end of the period. The state guarantee is triggered and the government pays the excess of insured losses that GRe is not able to pay, that is α.(D -βΠ) multiplied by the factor λ.
For Player 3, the private insurers, we use a mean-variance utility function assuming they are risk averse for catastrophic risks. 22 The portion of premiums kept by the insurers and the participation commission positively affect their utility. The expected payments and the variance in expected reimbursable damage affect it negatively. k/2 is assumed to be positive (catastrophe risk aversion). We finally assume in this model that the commission m, which the government offers the insurers to cover their management costs, is always high enough to incite them to participate (i.e., V>0). When the insurers believe the probability of damage is p, their utility V(.) is:
Players' Information. As discussed in the previous section, in this model the government is assumed to be the informed party whereas the private insurers have only prior beliefs on the distribution of risks: there is a proportion µ of low risk types and a proportion (1 -µ) of high risk types. Hence, the game is played with Player 3 having imperfect information, which is represented by two information sets in the extensive form of the game. Once again, the main goal here with the model is to understand the policy implications of such reversed asymmetry of information, rather than the sources of it.
Sequence of Decisions. The game takes place over three "periods" (See Figure 2) . In period one, Player 1 (Nature) chooses between two probability levels, p L or p H . In the second period, Player 2 (the government) receives the information on the probability of catastrophes during the period covered by the program and gets to choose between two policies (nodes G1 and G2 in the extensive form of the game), a low extra charge policy or a high level one:
. For choosing one of the two policies, the government takes account of its knowledge of the risk and the reaction from the insurers it anticipates. Finally, in the third period, Player 3 (the private insurance industry), who has no information on risk other than its prior belief, receives either the signal of a high extra charge policy (nodes I1 and I2) or the signal of a low extra charge policy (nodes I3 and I4).
But insurers only receive indirect information on the nature of the risks they are going to insure when the government chooses the extra charge policy. Observing that policy, they revise their prior beliefs using Bayes' rule. The government knows the prior beliefs of insurers. Then insurers choose a reinsurance transfer rate ] ;
[ α α α ∈ . The game is played and both the government and the insurers obtain a certain level of payment according to their actions and criteria. We can now draw the complete extensive form of the game as in Figure 2 .
Taxonomy of PBE Candidates. Considering the complete set of possibilities, when the government announces its β, this does not necessarily correspond to its real knowledge of expected damage. Insurers who observe the government's decision should update their beliefs and base their choice on the posterior distribution: Φ(p.D\β), which depends on the signal β received and compatible with Bayes' rule. Observing { } β β β ; ∈ , the insurers can use Bayes' rule to update µ(.) to Φ(. \ β).
Definition.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium with pure strategies is an action profile (β* ;α*) and posterior beliefs
can be obtained from the a priori distribution µ(.) (discrete in the model) by using the Bayes' s rule, whenever feasible. 
(ii) states that the insurers react optimally to governmental decisions given their posterior beliefs about pD . They choose the transfer rate to GRe maximizing their utility.
(iii) corresponds to the application of Bayes' rule by the insurers. It should be noted that if β is not part of government optimal action for some type, observing β is a probability-0 event, and Bayes' rule does not pin down posterior beliefs. Every posterior belief ) \ (. β Φ is then admissible, and every decision α, which is the best response for certain beliefs, can thus be put into play.
Consider now taxonomy of potential perfect Bayesian equilibria. A pooling equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the government chooses the same action whatever the type p.D. In that case, government does not reveal its knowledge about the risks. The insurers can not update their beliefs when they observe the equilibrium action:
A separating equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the government chooses two different actions depending on the type p.D. Observing the nature of the extra charge played by the government, the insurers know the governmental type. This case is then not acceptable for the government if it wants to keep the information secret, for example, in the case of terrorism.
Moreover, when the observed level of extra charge is inconsistent with the given equilibrium strategy, it is not possible to use Bayes's rule. We deal with this well-known problem by assuming that the private insurers view any "surprising" (i.e., out-of-equilibrium) action by the government as truly intentional (as opposed to being the result of some mistake). They first rule out the level of expected damage at which a rational government would not depart from the proposed equilibrium. Once their beliefs are updated accordingly, the private insurers' utility-maximizing reaction must deter the level extra charge at any other expected damage level. An equilibrium obtained in this manner turns out to be unique modulo the private insurers' current state of mind.
Government's Extra Charge Policy. As introduced above, we focus on two different extra charge policies that the government can implement, about which we make the following assumptions. First, the low extra charge equals the actuarial rate for the low risk
The advantage of such a low governmental extra charge policy is to limit ex ante the payment of the insured citizens and firms, thus making the program popular. But in the event of a catastrophe, the total premiums collected in that case is not sufficient to enforce the balance of the indemnification process without any ex post governmental intervention.
A difficulty for the government in creating this program, therefore, may be to find a balance between the expected damages and the extra charge policy in order to assure the autonomy of the program, that is to limit the ex post public intervention. This autonomy ends as soon as the total extra charges levied during the period of time studied here are not high enough to balance the public reinsurer's results. In this case, the state guarantee must be triggered in order to assure victim indemnification (equation (1)).
To be certain of enforcing the autonomy of this program, the government can define an extra charge policy that is sufficiently high so that the state guarantee would never be required, that is D ≥ Π .
β .
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. We call such a policy the governmental "high-risk sharing payment" (HRS payment) of the program. Indeed, it is worth noting that by so doing, the government defines a premium that could be much higher than the corresponding actuarial premium for high-expected risks (
In that case, the insurers may be also inclined to be less reinsured by GRe in order to keep a higher part of the high-risk sharing premiums. The HRS payment is a key part for a clear understanding of this model. Traditionally, the insurers choose to insure only "good risks" and refuse to insure "bad risks". However, with the HRS payment, the opposite situation may occur here. The insurers' retention rate, which represents their reaction function to the governmental extra charge policy, could be non-decreasing with their prior beliefs as to the proportion of high risks ) 1 ( µ − .
IV. Government Catastrophe Risk Management: Solutions of the Model
In this section, we focus on two policies the government can choose and we determine risksharing output in the corresponding perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Pooling Equilibrium: Using Insurers as "Indemnification Intermediaries". First, the government can decide to levy the same amount of extra charges whatever the level of risk. As discussed above, government that does not want to reveal information about the risk or threat can decide such a strategy. 24 By taking into account of GRe's equalization reserve R, the inequality becomes
. So the government has to define a high extra charge policy higher than
, with alpha the action decided by the insurers.
Moreover, we focus on a situation where government does not want to levy high level of extra-charge ex ante against policyholders. For instance, that's often the case at the beginning of a program's operation when the government seeks to obtain a consensus with the citizens and firms who will be required to purchase catastrophe insurance with this program. To encourage that acceptance, the government would choose such a low extra charge policy.
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The question is whether, according to the model, any equilibrium can be achieved with the government always choosing such a policy. If so, what is the ultimate risk sharing between the public and the private sector and under which conditions does it remain sustainable?
Lemma. The best response of the private insurance industry to a low extra charge policy β decided by the government whatever the type p.D is to transfer the largest portion of the risks to the public reinsurer.
Proof:
26 If the government chooses the low level of extra charge rate β, insurers will choose the level of transfer, which maximizes their utility according to this policy. Because the government plays the same action whatever the type p.D, the private insurance industry will choose its optimal level of transfer, denoted α(µ), by using their prior beliefs µ on p.D.
Considering:
The first derivative can be written as follows: 
As β.Π = p L .D, the inequality becomes: 
The implementation of a high extra-charge policy, whatever the level of risk that government agencies are aware of, is not part of the discussion here. Indeed, such systematic high beta policy would raise important equity questions which would make such policy very doubtful. 26 All proofs are put in appendix. This proof is in the main text to help the reader understanding the notation.
β , the fraction is strictly negative. The inequality is equivalent to α(µ) < 1 + a, with a > 0. As α ∈ [0,1], the inequality always holds true whatever the beliefs out of the equilibrium and the first differential is always positive. Therefore, private insurers choose to transfer the largest portion of the risks to the public reinsurer when they receive no information from the governmental action. □ The lemma is very intuitive. The insurers, receiving no information from the governmental signal β , thus maximize their utility considering their prior beliefs. As the insurers know the government has more information on this specific line of risks, they know that the government could be induced to levy less extra charge than the situation really requires. However, to determine whether equilibrium can be reached, it must be shown that the government has an interest in playing that action. Using the lemma, the conditions under which, if any, the government has no interest in deviating from that action need to be determined. Under the assumptions of the model, Proposition 1 holds. The demonstration is presented in the appendix A.
Proposition 1: Government Using Insurers as Intermediaries. Consider the following actions and beliefs: the government chooses a low extra charge policy β
whatever the probability of extreme risks, the private insurers choose the largest possible transfer rate α to the public reinsurer and the insurers' beliefs are Proposition 1 analyzes a first configuration of risk sharing between the government and the insurers in such a program. In that situation, the government asks private insurers to levy ex ante small extra charges on the basic policies of their insured. The insurers, who have no other information on the nature of the risk than their prior beliefs, levy those extra charges and choose to transfer the largest possible portion (as authorized through the reinsurance treaty) to the public reinsurer. In that case, such a program uses the network and management of private insurers as what we could call a "financial indemnification intermediary" per contra the payment of a pool participation commission m for managing that catastrophic risk line in their portfolio. In that case, government may have to pay ex post a portion of the damage corresponding to the state guarantee if triggered. 27 If we consider the GRe's equalization reserves noted R, the bounds are quite complicated. For instance,
There exists H L r and r such that: this pooling candidate is always an equilibrium iff
and we obtain When λ becomes too high, the government may estimate that the cost of financing the indemnification through the unlimited state guarantee becomes too expensive, counterbalancing the importance of not imposing a too high premium on the insured and/or not revealing the information about the risks. Indeed, as the value of the bound rates L r and H r decreases with the exogenous parameter λ, above a particular level of * λ , the government is incited to deviate from this equilibrium, which falls (see the proof of the proposition in the appendix).
An alternative for the government in that case-if it wants to continue playing that action whatever the type of risk-is to reduce the maximum possible transfer rate to the governmental reinsurer (i.e., decreasing α ). By so doing, policymakers in government limit the amount of damage that the Treasury would pay if the state guarantee is triggered.
The likelihood of catastrophes covered by the program plays in the same sense: the higher the likelihood of the level of catastrophic damage D occurring during the period of operation of the program ( L p and H p ), the less likely the government is to play the same low extra charge policy whatever the type of risk.
Separating Equilibrium: the Autonomy of the Program. We now consider a totally different situation. As discussed above, the continuous increase of governmental payments for repeated catastrophes can also encourage government to establish programs that would limit its intervention ex post. In that spirit, the second policy we consider now is the government seeking the program to be financially balanced for high-risk exposure. As proven in the preceding subsection, the pooling equilibrium can only be obtained with the government playing the action β. But, in so doing, the government knows that the insurers will take an intermediary course. That is not the government's objective here. In other words, the equilibrium candidates for the program's autonomy can only be separating equilibria. In a separating equilibrium, the government's choice reveals it's the risk type.
Moreover, the members of the government ought never to decide a low extra charge policy when they know that the probability of damage is high. Indeed, private insurers would decide to transfer the highest part of risk to GRe. And, because the total premiums transferred to the public reinsurer would not be sufficient to counterbalance the cost of indemnities D should catastrophes occur during the period covered by the program's operation, the state guarantee would always be triggered in that case. Conversely, when a high extra charge policy is determined although the probability of damage is low, the insurer will keep the highest part of premiums. Whereas the government levies more charges than necessary, the insurers will choose to transfer a minimal portion of premiums. This policy is not beneficial from the public sector's point of view.
Thus, defining a high extra charge policy for high-risks will be necessary to guarantee that autonomy. As discussed earlier, by so doing, the government may also create conditions that will induce private insurers to keep the largest part of the risks; that is to play the action α in the model.
The following proposition gives necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain the separating equilibrium. Under the assumptions of the model, the government, looking for the program's autonomy for high risks, will choose a specific extra charge policy for each level of risk. Moreover, we show that government has to offer a sufficient HRS payment for making that equilibrium sustainable. As a result, insurers may be induced to conserve the largest portion of high risks. This is equivalent to the following formal proposition. 
It is important to notice here that in this model, there are no "low type, high type" agents. The catastrophe impacts the country considered as a whole. So there is no consideration of subsidizing high risk by low risk types. Having a high probability means recurrent events over and over nationwide in a specified time period. 29 In that case, it makes sense for the government trying to limit its payments ex post to implement a policy of high premium payments by the insureds (part of Proposition 2). If a major event causing damage D occurs from time to time (p L ) government is more willing to subsidy the insureds. The establishment of specific mitigation/security measures and its link to the price of insurance is an important aspect we do not discuss in this paper.
On the Conditions of Equilibrium. If the probability of catastrophic damage is low, the extra charge policy decided by the government equals the actuarial premium. The insurers agree to participate because they receive a participation commission such that their utility V is positive. Nevertheless, the insurers have no real interest, without making any profit with the premiums, to bear a higher portion of the risks than the minimum required to earn the commission. They prefer to act again as an "indemnification intermediary". That explains the action profile ( )
If the probability of damage D is high, because the best strategy for the government is a high extra charge policy, the insurers have to consider the trade-off between keeping the largest portion of premiums (with a profit ) .
) or transferring a larger portion of the risk to GRe. Such a trade-off depends on all the parameters in the model. Here, the government, who would like to see the insurers conserve the largest portion of the high risks, has to offer them a HRS payment (the difference between Π . β and D p H . ) sufficiently high so that insurers play such an action. We find that the condition is
This threshold can also be written in relation to the insurers' catastrophic risk aversion ( 2 / k ). For the equilibrium of Proposition 2 to be sustainable, this aversion must not be too
). This condition is intuitive: as soon as the expected losses are too high insurers prefer to transfer the largest possible portion of the risks to GRe. And here again, they behave as financial intermediaries. Regarding potential insured damage, this threshold means that D has to be lower than the expression ) 1 ( .
Discussion and Future Research. Frontier Between Pooling and Separating Equilibrium Areas. Proposition 2 deals with this trade-off by taking into account the necessary and sufficient conditions for the government and the insurance industry to play a specific equilibrium in which the insurers conserve the largest portion of risks.
It can be noted that, according to Proposition 1, as soon as the minimal possible transfer rate offered by the public reinsurer is higher than a specific threshold, here
, the pooling equilibrium is not sustainable anymore.
According to Proposition 2, in that case we shift to the separating equilibrium (depending on the level of HRS). The expression H r thus gives also the equation of the frontier between pooling and separating equilibrium areas in the model.
The Cost of Risk Financing. The parameter λ may also be interpreted as the weight attributed by the Treasury to an ex post governmental payment (risk financing, the state guarantee being triggered) in order to balance the system.
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How does the pooling/separating frontier move with the cost of risk financing λ ? When the cost of ex post financing damage through governmental expenditure increases and is relatively high, i.e. when λ is relatively high, then the threshold H r decreases. So does the pooling equilibrium's area. In particular, the Treasury has a clear interest in that case to induce insurers into keeping the largest possible portion of the risks (for instance by levying ex ante higher amounts of extra charges on the insured) when λ is large, i.e. playing the separating strategy.
Information Sharing and Social Welfare. Interestingly enough, it can be shown that as soon as the parameter λ is higher than 1 (which is always the case as soon as this parameter is the shadow cost of public funds), the social welfare -defined as the sum of U and V-at the separating equilibrium defined by Proposition 2 is always higher (or at least equal) than the social welfare associated with the pooling equilibrium described in Proposition 1.
In a more practical sense, that means that the government should be induced to look for a effective risk-sharing with the private insurers instead of just using them as simple intermediaries. This can be seen as an argument in favor of more systematically sharing information on catastrophic risks. 30 In the appendix, proof of Proposition 2 explains the other strategies of insurers when this condition is not sustainable. For intermediary levels of risk aversion or damage-that is,
-the insurers will play a cession rate (best response) included in the possible cession range offered by GRe. 31 For this, the literature on risk-managers' choices between mitigation and reparation can help us. Mitigation measures, which permit the reduction of loss probability ex ante, are often less costly than a reparation ex post. The government may prefer to spend public expenditures than to improve mitigation programs.
On the other hand, we do not integrate in this model the potential cost associated with the revelation of information. Consider the dynamic uncertainty associated with terrorism risks. It is obvious that the probability of a successful attack depends on terrorist groups' knowledge of what the intelligence services of the target country know about their plan to attack. A more realistic model would be such that the choice of a separating equilibrium, which reveals information, could modify the likelihood of an attack, making it endogenous. Depending on how this affects the level of probability and the potential damage, the pooling equilibrium could be such that the social welfare associated with it would be higher.
The Basic Contract Premiums. Further extensions can be considered. Some countries may want to create partnerships such as those proposed by this paper or to imagine related systems. In that spirit, another parameter is essential in the model: the level of basic contract premiums to which the governmental extra charge policy is applied, i.e. Π .
For obvious reasons, governments have an interest in applying the extra charge policy to the largest possible segment of insurance policies (we illustrate this point with the French and U.S. markets in Section 5). Intuitively, when the level of total premiums on which the extra charge policy is applied is large, the model may more often lead to a pooling equilibrium; for a given governmental weight attributed to finance ex post the cost of a catastrophe, the government could be more likely to choose a low extra charge rate whatever the type "given" by Nature. So they could simply use insurers as indemnification intermediaries. Conversely, when the financial basis Π is low, government may tend to share its knowledge about the risks more systematically in order to develop and sustain a long-term risk-sharing partnership with the private insurers.
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All things being equal, if we consider that the couple (Π,λ) characterizes a given country, it would be interesting to test empirically the results of the model by applying to it different values of the national parameters λ and Π.
The Role of the Asymmetry of Information. Finally, it is useful to consider the two Propositions in light of the recent economic literature on asymmetry of information in insurance markets. In a traditional approach a la Rothshild- Stiglitz (1976 ), or Stiglitz (1977 for a monopolistic insurer,-i.e. an insurer/insured relationship where the most informed party regarding the risk is the insured -high risks are entirely covered when low risks are only partially covered at the equilibrium (when it exists). Thirty years after this seminal work, there is a bourgeoning theoretical literature that discusses the impact of the mirror assumption, i.e. the insuring part more informed about the type of risk than the insured. In that case, it can be proved that the low-risk type agents might be fully covered at the equilibrium when high-risk type agents might be only partially insured (Villeneuve, 2000; Henriet and Michel-Kerjan, 2006) . Under the assumptions of the model developed here, our results are consistent with these.
V. Illustrations
This section considers the extent to which the risk-sharing aspects analyzed by the model can fit with more practical situations at a national level. We consider two illustrations: (1) the French insurance markets and what would be the result of an application of such a model to the U.S. insurance market; (2) these issues in the context of emerging large-scale terrorism risks.
Major Natural Hazards: Applications to the French and U.S. Markets. The 1982 French program for covering against natural catastrophes provides an interesting application of the model. The so-called Cat. Nat. program is actually built upon a risk-sharing between insurers and government through the establishment of a public reinsurer. Historically, there is evidence that for at least the first 15 years of operation of the program insurers have not searched to get information about that line of risk. 33 And data on that market are available for a 20-year period. Until 1982, French insurers had refused to cover against natural hazards. The discussions between government and insurers that took place after the 1981 flooding episodes led the creation of a specific partnership between the insurance industry and the French government. Under such program, insurers receive a governmental commission to levy a "natural catastrophe" surcharge against all their property and casualty policyholders and to manage the indemnification process in case of a catastrophe. Insurers have the opportunity to be reinsured for that special line of their portfolio by the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR), an unlimited state-guarantee reinsurance company. The French Treasury decides the level of surcharge. With these specific parameters, this system remains unique worldwide.
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Interestingly enough, while remaining cautious about the interpretation, the evolution of that scheme seems to follow the theoretical results obtained through the two propositions. At the infancy of the system, a period of low damages, the government levied a low surcharge (5.5% of the insurance premiums) and the insurers' transfer rate to the CCR was high.
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With time, the cost due to natural disasters increased, as did the surcharge set by government. 36 Insurers, who from now on would receive higher premiums as well as a substantial governmental commission, decided to keep more premiums (i.e., a larger portion of the high risks) instead of choosing to be largely reinsured by the CCR.
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A system similar to the one suggested in this paper could also be established with some benefit in the U.S. although its mandatory component could be seen as difficult for political and cultural reasons. Moss (1999) considers the following application. Suppose that the federal government levies an extra charge on every U.S. property insurance policies with a rate varying between 5 and 20% and two-thirds of this extra charge applied on base premiums for motor vehicles. The results of this estimation are illustrative. According to Moss, "if this schedule of surcharges had been applied between 1977 and 1993 to the 33 For example, there have been for many years some risk mapping undertaken by the French Ministry of Environment (so called "Plan de Prevention de Risques"). That information, however, has not been accessible in a systematical way for insurers. Indeed, insurance associations decided to create a system transferring that information to insurers' database in 2000 only (what the French call the "Mission Risques Naturels"), 18 years after the creation of the program. In fact, in a country where insurers have to provide such coverage but can not differentiate the price depending on the level of risk, there was no incentive for them to invest in costly risk mapping process. The two major storms that devastated Europe in December 1999 and cost French insurers nearly 7 billion euros certainly changed their perspective. 34 For analyses on the French program in English, see Michel-Kerjan (2001) and Vallet (2004) ; for analyses in French, see ), Munier (1997 ), de Marcellis (1997 , and more recently, Latruffe and Picard (2005) . 35 On average, during the first years of operation of the program, the insurers used to transfer 85% of the risks. 36 The surcharge rate increased from 5.5% of the basic premium to 9% in 1988 and to 12% in 2000; the major storms Lothar and Martin devastated France in December 1999 and inflicted insured losses that triggered the government guarantee. 37 Between 1988 and 1999, with a minimum cession rate required of 40%, the average cession rate to the public reinsurer has remained stable around 43% (CCR, 2000) . Starting in 2000, the new minimum rate required by the CCR has been increased up to 50%; it is noticeable that over the period 2000-2003 the average cession rate of the insurers to the public reinsurer has remained stable around 52% (CCR, 2004) . relevant lines of property insurance, annual receipts would have been enough to cover all private insurance payments for natural catastrophes as well as all federal disaster payments and still leave a cumulative surplus of nearly $2 billion an the end of the period" (Moss, 1999, p 346) . After some devastating natural disasters in the U.S.-hurricane Andrew in 1992, the Mississippi floods in 1993, and the Northridge earthquake in 1994-the question has been raised again as to the limitations to the insurability of such events by the private sector alone as well as the need to the development of public-private partnerships. It must be stressed that if such an extra charge policy had been applied to all property and casualty lines, as done in this model, the surplus at the end of 1993 would have totaled no less than $148 billion (Moss, 1999) , i.e. enough liquidity to cover all damages including these three catastrophes without requiring any federal payment or extra reimbursement from insurers.
The Case of Terrorism Risk. Although both terrorist activities and natural disasters now have a recognized potential to create catastrophic losses, there is a significant difference between these two risks that raises some challenges for the private sector in providing insurance protection without some type of partnership with the public sector.
The sharing of information on terrorism risk between all stakeholders is clearly different from that of natural hazards. In the latter case, with the creation and development of publicprivate partnerships, new scientific information can be shared among the stakeholders (evolving from a pooling equilibrium to a separating one in the framework developed here).
As discussed, the situation is different with respect to terrorism, as information on possible attacks or current threats is kept secret by government agencies for reasons of national security (Michel-Kerjan, 2003) .
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Because of this feature, the central question with respect to terrorism risk is not whether the government has to intervene in insurance markets because of market failure, but rather how the government and the insurance industry can work together to provide coverage for citizens and firms. According to the model, this could be an argument for the government to guarantee ex post risk financing in the case of successful attacks-pooling PBE-rather than implementing more systematic information sharing process-separating PBE.
An analysis of the terrorism risk insurance programs in place today around the world reveals that in most industrialized countries the program is based on the creation of a partnership between the private sector of insurance and government, which provides reinsurance coverage for extreme losses. For example, insurers are used as financial intermediaries in the Spanish Consorcio. They share part of the risk and are reinsured by the government in others, as it is done in Australia, France, the U.K. and the U.S., for example (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2004; Michel-Kerjan and Pedell, 2005; OECD, 2005) . This question has not taken a central stage yet in most Asian countries, despite of the real threat of terrorism there. As new alerts have been released of large-scale terrorist attacks on leading Asian financial centers, that is likely to change the perspective (Arnold, 2005) .
VI. Concluding Remarks
The emergence of a new dimension of loss is now recognized as we move from more local and well-analyzed events to extreme phenomena about which we have limited knowledge. This was tragically illustrated, again, by the large-scale tsunami that devastated Asia in 38 Similar to natural hazard loss estimation models developed since the end of the 80's, the development over the past two years of a first generation of quantification models for terrorism risk provide better estimation of potential losses associated with specific scenario of attacks (Grossi and Kunreuther, 2005) ; however, the asymmetry of information between government agencies and the insurers is relative to p and not to D.
December 2004. In the end, a key question for every national policy for covering catastrophic risks is Who should pay for the costs of these extreme events?
Building on strengths of the private and public sectors, the development of public-private partnerships constitutes an appealing way to solve the problem of insurability of these events. Quite surprisingly, however, little research has been undertaken yet to better measure what the partnership is really about. With government increasingly facing budget constraint, to what extent does the traditional assumption of its trying to maximize the social welfare-including insurers' utility-held? What information do the "partners" really share? What is the impact of asymmetric information among the partners? What risk and benefit from partnering do they share in the end? At what price?
When it comes to national security, the question of available information is critical. This paper also highlights the importance to study in more detail the trade-off between information sharing, protection of shared information, and ultimate risk sharing. This question is likely to be with us for a long time to go and calls for research to be undertaken in that emerging field.
Although the theoretical approach introduced in this paper simplifies the complexity of these issues, the underlying insights the model presents reasonably capture some important elements of any public-private partnership of risk coverage for extreme events. Hence this approach may also open the window for future analysis.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
To prove that ) ;
( α β constitutes the action profile at the pooling equilibrium, we have to show that considering some private insurers' beliefs out of equilibrium, say ) 1 ; ( ν ν − , the government has no interest in deviation.
We note
, the expression of the public-sector utility when knowing the probability of a catastrophe is i.
When Nature chooses L p p = . According to the lemma, the members of the government know that if they choose the low extra charge policy β , the insurers will play the largest transfer rate action. In such a case, because
, the Treasury will have to support GRe.
It will never be in the government's interest to deviate considering the insurers' beliefs ν and action out of equilibrium
As, by playing the low extra charge policy, the state guarantee will be triggered, we have: 
• As soon as 
out of the equilibrium in order to lead insurers to play the "low transfer rate" strategy. and that whatever the insurers' beliefs out of the equilibrium: the government will always be incited to deviate from the candidate;
When Nature chooses
• When Conversely, when we take by chance two different beliefs out off the equilibrium, it is easy to obtain, with at least one of these beliefs, a contradiction with the fact that the action profile . Indeed, the best response of the insurers, who think bearing low risks in that case, is the highest possible transfer rate to the CCR (cf. Lemma).
If the government, although knowing it is low risk, decided a high extra charge policy, β , it would convince the private insurers that it is high type and would obtain ) , ( 
That case is precisely the one we would like to study. However, in order to offer a complete demonstration of possibility, we describe also the two other possible cases. We will come back on that first case after. 
That is for condition (S-a):
We find one of the same conditions that for the pooling case.
However, the second one allows differentiating the pooling area and the separating ones. Precisely, such a condition eliminates possible pooling equilibria (cf. proof of Proposition 1).
